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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PANEL REMARKS

IS GUIDED DISCRETION SUFFICIENT?
OVERVIEW OF STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

RICHARD S. FRASE*
The purpose of these remarks is to provide a brief overview of state
sentencing guideline systems—where they are, how they have evolved, and
how they differ from each other and from the Federal Guidelines.1
The idea of sentencing guidelines overseen by a permanent sentencing
commission was originally proposed by federal judge Marvin Frankel in the
early 1970s. Several bills to accomplish this were introduced in Congress, but
Minnesota was the first jurisdiction in the United States to place such a system
in operation. There is some irony that a federal judge first proposed this idea –
not only were sentencing guidelines first adopted in the states, but many people

* Richard S. Frase is the Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the University of
Minnesota. An earlier version of this speech was delivered in Minneapolis on September 7, 1999,
on the occasion of Professor Frase’s reappointment to the Berger chair.
1. The principal sources for this summary are: Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions
and Their Guidelines, 17 CRIME & JUSTICE 137 (1993); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing
Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173 (1995); Kevin R. Reitz, The Statute of
Sentencing Guidelines Reforms in the U.S., 10(6) OVERCROWDED TIMES 1 (1999); and various
state-specific reports and evaluations too numerous to cite, collected by the author. (Many of the
latter have been published either in the FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER, or in OVERCROWDED
TIMES. Additional information about particular state guidelines systems may be obtained from
the contact persons listed on the web page of the National Association of Sentencing
Commissions — http://www.ussc.gov/states/nascaddr.htm. The Association’s newsletter, also
available on this web page, reports recent state guidelines developments. Questions, comments,
and factual corrections are very welcome, and should be addressed to Professor Frase at:
frase001@maroon.tc.umn.edu.
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believe that state guidelines have been much more successful than the federal
version.
As of late 1999, about one-third of the states had sentencing guidelines in
effect, and guidelines reforms were being considered in a number of other
states. But, state guidelines systems are not all alike; some states have
attempted to go farther than Minnesota, while many others have done much
less.
One of the themes I want to stress at the outset is that although state
guidelines systems are very different from each in a number of the ways, they
have a couple of things in common that distinguish them from the Federal
Guidelines. Across the board, I believe that state systems are more flexible
than the Federal Guidelines. There is a range among the state guideline
systems. Some state systems are so flexible that they are hardly “guidelines”
at all, others are rather restrictive. But anyone who thinks that sentencing
guidelines are inherently inflexible and take away all discretion would be
wrong.
Another thing that distinguishes state guidelines is that they are relatively
simple to apply. The Federal Guidelines are quite ambitious; they try to
structure and define every single decision. This is related to the flexibility
point, but it goes beyond that. State guidelines are generally relatively short
documents; sometimes very short. The Minnesota guidelines commission, for
one, has been explicit about the value of simplicity. No matter how much we
would like to regulate everything and no matter how many different goals we
want to achieve, it is important to keep the guidelines relatively easy to apply
and easy for courts, defendants, and the public to understand. This is an
important point that was lost in the federal system.
In the remainder of these comments, I will examine the evolution,
successes, and failures of guidelines reforms in Minnesota and other
jurisdictions, and the lessons we can draw from twenty years of experience
with state guidelines. First, I will briefly describe the state guidelines reforms
that have been proposed, adopted, and in some cases, repealed. Next, I will
examine the purposes which sentencing guidelines are intended to serve, how
those purposes have evolved over time, and the extent to which state and
Federal Guidelines reforms have achieved their various purposes. Then, I will
discuss several major limitations of guidelines reforms in all jurisdictions: the
lack of effective controls over prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining
practices and the very limited attempts to regulate or encourage the use of
intermediate sanctions. In spite of these limitations, however, I argue that state
sentencing guidelines have proven to be much better than any other sentencing
system which has been tried or proposed.
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I. WHERE, WHEN, AND WHAT KINDS OF GUIDELINES?
A.

Jurisdictions that have, once had, are considering, or have rejected
“guidelines”

As shown in the table accompanying these remarks, some form of
sentencing guidelines is currently being used in seventeen states and in the
federal courts.2 In addition, at least eight other jurisdictions (listed at the
bottom of the table) are considering the adoption of guidelines. Another
important development was the adoption, in 1993, of the American Bar
Association’s revised standards for sentencing (Third Edition). These
standards strongly endorse the adoption of sentencing guidelines incorporating
all six of the key structural features listed in the table.
Guidelines have suffered some defeats, however. Although the number of
guidelines systems has grown steadily, at least six states have considered and
rejected the idea of sentencing guidelines. Moreover, two states (Louisiana
and Wisconsin) formerly had guidelines but then repealed them, and three
other states have substantially weakened their guidelines. Oregon voters
approved a ballot measure that turned many of the recommended guideline
prison sentences into mandatory minimum prison terms, and the legislature
replaced the sentencing commission with a citizen “policy” board. Florida and
Tennessee abolished their commissions completely. Moreover, Florida’s
remaining “guidelines” no longer limit judicial severity: trial judges have
complete discretion to impose any sentence between the recommended
guidelines term and the statutory maximum. Sentences below the guidelines
still require a written statement of reasons and are appealable by the
prosecution.
B.

Not all Guidelines are Alike — Major variations

The accompanying table indicates some of most important structural
differences among guidelines systems, but there are actually many more
variations. For instance, Delaware, Florida, and Ohio do not use a grid
(although their “narrative” or “point-system” guidelines could be translated
into a grid). State and federal grids vary considerably in such things as:
whether certain offenses have a separate grid; the number of grid cells; the
breadth of cell ranges; and whether the ranges of adjoining cells overlap.
Guidelines systems also differ in other ways, including: (1) the number of
disposition options permitted for a given case (e.g., prison, jail, restrictive
intermediate sanctions, etc.); (2) whether any guidance is offered as to the
choice among sentencing purposes; (3) how criminal history is defined; (4)
how multiple offenses are sentenced; and (5) the extent to which the

2. See Table 1.
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sentencing commission has made independent judgments about appropriate
sentences (so-called “prescriptive” rules), rather than simply compiling
guidelines which are descriptive of past judicial and paroling practices.
As shown in the table, three states’ guidelines lack a permanent sentencing
commission. Alaska’s guidelines were created by statute, and have been
greatly expanded by appellate caselaw. As was noted previously, guidelines in
Florida and Tennessee were written by commissions that were later abolished.
Utah and three other states initially did not have a permanent sentencing
commission. State sentencing commissions vary considerably in their makeup,
but most of them are larger and more widely representative than the federal
commission (e.g., including attorneys and probation officers). The duties,
staffing, and budget of sentencing commissions varies a great deal. An
essential component of guidelines, however, is the idea of a commission that
can do research on past sentencing practices, evaluate the use of resources, and
prioritize the use of those resources. Perhaps most importantly, the
commission can predict and seek to avoid prison overcrowding (a function that
I address below). In short, a permanent sentencing commission is now
generally seen as an essential component of a sentencing guideline system.
Guidelines systems also differ greatly in their scope. The most important
differences relate to parole: six states (Utah, Pennsylvania, and the other states
with “blanks” in the parole column of the accompanying table) retain parole
release discretion for all offenses, and have only adopted guidelines to
structure judges’ sentencing decisions. Two states (Alaska and Michigan)
retain parole for a substantial number of crimes. A number of state guideline
systems use parole only for a few, very serious offenses, usually those subject
to life imprisonment. Ohio retains a judicial releasing option. Thus, abolition
of parole release is apparently not seen as an essential feature of state
guidelines, although it has become more common in recent years.
Another important structural feature has to do with whether guidelines
rules are legally enforceable — that is, binding on trial courts and subject to
effective appellate review. Six states (Utah, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia,
Arkansas, and Missouri) explicitly provide that their guidelines are “voluntary”
and not subject to appeal. In Pennsylvania, sentence appeal is available, but
appeals have almost no impact due to the lax standard of review. In North
Carolina, the guidelines are very strict as to some sentencing issues, but very
loose as to others, and there is almost no appellate caselaw. Sentencing
caselaw is limited in Tennessee, due in part to very broad guidelines ranges
and retention of parole. In Florida and Ohio, some decisions applying the
guidelines are appealable, and some are not. To summarize: effective appellate
review is found in less than half of the state guidelines systems.
The next column shown in the table indicates which jurisdictions have
required their sentencing commission or some other state agency to assess the
resource-impact of proposed sentencing guidelines and statutes, in particular,
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the predicted effect on prison populations. Impact-assessment is more accurate
under guidelines, because guidelines sentences are more uniform and
predictable. Such assessment has always been a key feature of the Minnesota
Guidelines, but it was lacking in most other early systems. In later years,
however, as state prison populations began to shoot up, increasing costs and
raising problems of overcrowding and court intervention, more and more states
began to see resource-impact analysis as an essential feature of guidelines.
Indeed, increased prison population has been a major reason to adopt a
guidelines system and a sentencing commission. Almost every new guidelines
system created since the mid-1980s has required resource-impact studies, and
several older systems have added this feature. It must be stressed, however,
that guidelines systems use resource-impact studies in very different ways.
Some, like Minnesota, use these studies to shape sentencing policy; if the
impact projections show that a proposed guideline rule or statute will
substantially increase prison populations, that proposal is likely to be rejected,
or at least greatly narrowed in scope. But other systems, such as the federal
one, generally use resource-impact studies only after the rules have been
written — that is, as a warning to the legislature to expand prison capacity in
order to accommodate the new rules.
The next-to-last column in the table shows which systems have attempted
in some way to structure decisions on the use of intermediate sanctions — that
is, sentences which are less severe than imprisonment but more restrictive than
standard probation, such as residential or outpatient treatment, home detention,
intensive supervision, drug- and alcohol-use monitoring, community service,
restitution, and fines. The earliest guideline systems only regulated prison
decisions, that is, who should go to prison and for how long; non-prison
sentences were left to the judges. This is still true of Minnesota, where nonprison sentences are given in almost eighty percent of felony cases (and where
almost all jail sentences, which can be for up to one year, are not regulated by
the guidelines). This is a good example of how even a system that is a fairly
ambitious about regulating discretion can still retain a lot of flexibility. Since
the mid-1980s, however, more and more guidelines systems have incorporated
intermediate sanctions, and this is also recommended by the revised ABA
standards. This trend, like the growth in resource-impact analysis, probably
reflects rising prison populations, and a desire to encourage judges to consider
effective non-custodial sentencing options. Nevertheless, only about half of
existing guidelines systems attempt to regulate intermediate sanctions. I will
return to this topic later in these remarks.
The far right-hand column in the table shows the systems that have
guidelines to regulate misdemeanors as well as felonies.
Only five
jurisdictions (and the ABA Standards) propose guidelines for misdemeanors
(or at least, the more serious ones). Perhaps surprisingly, there does not seem
to be a strong correlation between the attempt to regulate intermediate

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

430

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:425

sanctions and the decision to promulgate misdemeanor guidelines — even
though intermediate sanctions would seem to be especially appropriate for less
serious cases. Of course, there are also many inmates in state prison who are
appropriate candidates for intermediate sanctions. The judicial sentencing
seminars conducted by Bob Levy at the University of Minnesota and by Mike
Wolf at St. Louis University have been helping us explore these issues; the
cases discussed in these seminars suggest that there are a lot of people in state
prisons who really do not need to be there.
Looking at the table as a whole, we can identify a number of “strong”
guidelines systems — those with at least four of the key features referred to
above. These systems include Minnesota, Washington, Delaware, Oregon,
Kansas, North Carolina, and the Federal Guidelines System. At the other
extreme are very “weak” systems — those with no more than two of these key
features, such as Maryland (which recently reexamined its approach, but
decided not to make any major changes), Alaska, and Tennessee. These
variations do not necessarily mean that the weaker forms of sentencing
guidelines are always wrong. Perhaps a less ambitious guidelines reform is all
that some states are able to enact. Under such circumstances, it may be that
some form of guidelines is better than none. Moreover, several jurisdictions
(e.g., Michigan and Virginia) began with weak guidelines, then substantially
upgraded them. On the other hand, weaker guidelines do appear to be more
vulnerable to being partially or entirely repealed. The two total-repeal states
(Louisiana and Wisconsin) both had voluntary guidelines for judges, retained
parole, and were missing at least one other key feature shown in the table. The
two states that abolished their sentencing commissions, Florida and Tennessee,
were also both relatively weak systems. Finally, it is not necessarily the case
that relatively strong systems are always better. As I will explain later in these
remarks, there are a number of major problems with the relatively “strong”
Federal Guidelines.
II. THE CHANGING PURPOSES OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
What were the original goals of guidelines reforms, and how have these
goals evolved over time? The initial goals provide familiar but important
background — we have to know where we have been, and how we got here, in
order to evaluate the present situation and our options for the future. In
particular, we need to recognize when supposedly new sentencing reforms are
actually just “re-runs” of old ideas — we do not want to make the same
mistakes all over again. At the same time, we also need to recognize that the
goals of sentencing reform have evolved over time. These changes show how
guidelines have responded to new as well as old policy concerns, all of which
must be accommodated in any successful sentencing system.
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Initial goals: Reduced sentencing disparity, and more rational sentencing
policy

The initial goals of sentencing guidelines reforms were two-fold. First, to
reduce sentencing discretion and its resulting disparities; and second, to
promote more rational sentencing policy developed and monitored by a
specialized sentencing commission.
The goal of disparity reduction was closely tied to a debate about the
purposes that criminal penalties should be designed to serve. Prior to adoption
of sentencing guidelines, the dominant purposes of punishment were
rehabilitation (seeking to change the underlying causes of the defendant’s
criminal behavior) and incapacitation (preventing crime by confining
dangerous offenders). To achieve these goals, judges and parole boards were
given extremely broad discretion to assess individually the rehabilitation
potential and dangerousness of each offender. Under this “indeterminate”
sentencing system, judges could impose any sentence from probation to the
maximum prison term authorized by law (e.g., twenty years for unarmed
robbery). Most systems required offenders to serve some fraction of their
prison term before becoming eligible for parole; after that point, the parole
board had unreviewable discretion to decide how much of the remaining
sentence would have to be served.
In the 1970s, a broad, “bi-partisan” consensus emerged that discretion in
sentencing must be substantially reduced. Unregulated discretion was seen as
having failed to provide sufficiently certain and severe punishment to
discourage crime and incapacitate dangerous offenders. It also produced
unjust disparities in the treatment of equally serious cases. Studies were done
which showed that when you gave a sentencing file to a group of judges they
proposed very different sentences; it was not just that “each case is different.”
Many people also came to believe that individualized assessments of each
offender’s treatment needs, progress in treatment, and degree of dangerousness
were too unreliable to justify the disparities they produced. In addition, most
treatment programs could not be shown to be effective. Broad parole
discretion also left both the public and prisoners themselves with no way of
knowing how long imprisonment would last. Some observers argued that the
solution to all of these problems was a sentencing system based not on crime
prevention, but upon retribution or “just deserts” — each offender should be
punished in direct proportion to his or her degree of blameworthiness, with
little or no consideration given to a defendant’s need for rehabilitation or
incapacitation.
The goal of achieving more rational sentencing policy has two facets.
First, the use of an independent, appointed commission was designed to
insulate sentencing policy decisions from short-term political pressures (and
the tendency of elected politicians to prefer more punitive policies, so as not to
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appear “soft on crime”). Second, the commission, like other administrative
agencies, was expected to collect data and develop expertise that would
contribute to more informed sentencing policy. The commissions’ database
and expertise (and in Minnesota, its mandate to avoid prison overcrowding),
was also expected to promote a more comprehensive, long-term, and fiscally
responsible view. By setting sentencing policy for all crimes (or at least, all
felonies), guidelines systems could (1) avoid piecemeal reforms in response to
the current “crime of the week,” (2) help manage more effectively the state’s
prison capacity, and (3) set priorities for the use of limited correctional
resources.
B.

Evolving goals

Since Minnesota’s guidelines first became effective, sentencing goals and
values in Minnesota and other guidelines jurisdictions have evolved
considerably. Of the original guidelines goals summarized above, it appears
that the goal of disparity reduction has become somewhat less important, while
other goals have become more important. In order to achieve all of these
goals, many state guidelines systems have, in effect, adopted a hybrid
sentencing theory sometimes known as “limiting retributivism” (or as it is
known in Minnesota, “modified just deserts”). Under this approach, retributive
or “just deserts” values merely set upper and lower bounds—sentences must
not be either excessively severe or unduly lenient. This theory thus defines a
range of “deserved” punishments, within which courts may consider crimeprevention, resource limits, victim and community concerns, and other
appropriate sentencing goals.3
The evolution in guidelines goals is evident in the accompanying table.
For example, almost every guidelines system adopted or revised since the mid1980s has included resource-impact assessments, in an attempt to avoid prison
overcrowding and control the growth of prison populations. More recent
guideline reforms are also more likely to regulate and encourage the use of
intermediate sanctions. Broader use of such sanctions is intended to reduce
unnecessary prison use, thus avoiding prison over-crowding and reducing
prison costs. This approach is also intended to better promote public safety.
Here are some of the other important goals that have been added or given
greater emphasis as guidelines reforms have evolved over the past two
decades.
Truth in Sentencing. Although this term has several meanings, the most
common refers to the goal of ensuring that offenders serve a high percentage of
3. The theory of “limiting retributivism” is most often associated with the writings of
Professor Norval Morris. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of sentencing purposes in
Minnesota, resulting in a system very similar to what Morris proposed, see Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUSTICE 363 (1997).
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the prison sentence imposed by the court and are not released early by parole
or prison officials. In one sense, truth in sentencing was always part of
sentencing reforms that included the abolition of parole release discretion. But
“truth in sentencing” has come to mean abolishing parole, period—whether or
not judicial sentencing guidelines are enacted. Moreover, the emphasis has
shifted from disparity-reduction to systemic “honesty” and increased sentence
severity. Thus, whereas early guidelines combined with abolition of parole
allowed offenders to receive a subsequent sentence reduction of up to thirtythree percent for good conduct in prison, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—
and an increasing number of state sentencing guideline systems—define “truth
in sentencing” so that offenders receive a sentence reduction of no more than
fifteen percent for good conduct. Adoption of this definition (and of guidelines
which include abolition of parole) was strongly encouraged by a 1994 federal
statute which provided substantial funds for prison construction to states that
abolish parole and require inmates convicted of serious crimes to serve at least
eighty-five percent of their sentences.4 At the same time, this statute has also
encouraged some states to consider adopting guidelines. The reason is that
prisoners in their states were previously serving a very low proportion of their
sentences (sometimes less than twenty percent). With prisoners now required
to serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences, states are facing the
prospect of massive increases in prison populations unless judges can be
persuaded (via guidelines) to lower their sentence lengths.
Public Safety. As noted above, the original guidelines emphasis on “Just
Deserts” represented a rejection of the prior policy of allowing judges and
parole boards to make individualized assessments of each defendant’s risk of
re-offending. The goal of public safety was not completely abandoned,
however. Judges and corrections officials were still allowed to consider
offender dangerousness when setting the conditions of probation or post-prison
supervised release.
Moreover, recommended prison sentences under
sentencing guidelines systems have always given substantial emphasis to the
defendant’s prior record. This factor has very little significance under a “Just
Deserts” theory, which assumes that the defendant has already “paid” for his
prior convictions. The extent of the defendant’s prior record is primarily
important as an indicator of his probable degree of dangerousness and
amenability to treatment or supervision. But guidelines systems prefer to make
these assessments on the basis of group or actuarial risk, rather than
individualized, case-by-case diagnoses. Of course, guidelines systems that
retain parole-release discretion allow case-specific dangerousness assessments
of all imprisoned offenders.

4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
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These limited forms of risk assessment and risk management were not
enough, however, to satisfy judges, legislators, and the public. In Minnesota
and most other guidelines systems, public safety has become an increasingly
important goal. Thus, in 1989 the Minnesota Legislature amended the
guidelines enabling statute to specify that public safety should be the
Commission’s “primary” consideration, in enacting or modifying Guidelines
provisions. The Legislature has also enacted a series of laws authorizing or
mandating increased penalties for certain dangerous or repeat offenders. As
for other states’guidelines systems, some explicitly included public safety as a
goal (e.g., Ohio), and newer guidelines systems are likely to incorporate
recidivist and “dangerous offender” provisions, especially for sex crimes.
Rehabilitation and Reintegration. As with public safety concerns,
rehabilitative goals were initially de-emphasized under most sentencing
guidelines reforms, but they never went away entirely. In some systems they
remained quite important and may have increased in importance. In
Minnesota, for example, rehabilitation is a very important goal: the state is
sometimes called the “land of 10,000 treatment centers” rather than “10,000
lakes.”
Rehabilitation and reintegration (through community-based
sentencing) are pursued by varying the conditions of probation. Non-prison
sentences are not regulated under the Minnesota guidelines and account for
almost eighty percent of felony sentences. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that, when judges are deciding whether to depart from
presumptive prison or probation sentences, they may consider the defendant’s
particular “amenability” to probation — a concept which at least implicitly
includes assessments of rehabilitation potential (as well as public safety).
Similar “amenability” concepts are found in the departure standards of other
states’ guidelines systems, for example, in Ohio and North Carolina. In 1993,
the Minnesota Legislature also repealed the provision in the 1978 guidelines
enabling act, which had required prison treatment programs to be entirely
voluntary. Corrections officials are now authorized to withhold “good time”
credits from offenders who refuse to participate in prison programs.
Restorative and Community Justice. The past twenty years have witnessed
a substantial growth in programs designed to give greater attention to the needs
and perspectives of crime victims, the local community, or both. Sentencing
alternatives such as Victim-Offender Mediation, Restitution, and Community
Service have become increasingly popular in Minnesota and other state
guidelines systems. Guidelines systems have yet to recognize formally such
programs and sentencing alternatives, but as I will explain later in these
comments, most systems readily accommodate these new ideas. Again, if you
have a more flexible guidelines system, it can incorporate a lot of different
theories.
Rewarding guilty pleas and other forms of cooperation. All sentencing
guidelines systems appear to recognize the importance of encouraging
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defendants to cooperate by pleading guilty, providing testimony against other
offenders, obeying conditions of probation, and maintaining good conduct in
prison. All of these forms of cooperation are “purchased” by giving
defendants less than their authorized guidelines sentence. Here again,
competing, practical goals require a flexible rather than a strict conception of
“just deserts,” that is, a theory of “limiting retributivism” which permits a
range of penalties. Plea-bargaining practices have not changed much under the
Minnesota guidelines or, I believe, under most other state guidelines. A guilty
plea, including an agreement of the parties about the most appropriate
sentence, is a basis in Minnesota, and in most if not all state guidelines
systems, to depart from the guidelines. Of course, allowing such agreed
departures risks undercutting the guidelines. I will return to the this topic later
in these remarks.
Broadly-shared Sentencing Power. Public officials and sentencing
scholars have increasingly viewed sentencing as an exercise in shared
authority, seeking to achieve a workable and stable balance between the roles
and influence of a wide variety of public and private parties. Lawmakers often
view sentencing guidelines as a way to re-assert legislative control over
sentencing (albeit indirectly, through the legislatively-appointed commission).
Under indeterminate sentencing regimes, the input of lawmakers is limited to
deciding what should be criminal the maximum penalty, and whether a
mandatory minimum penalty should apply. Similarly, trial judges often
support sentencing guidelines which include abolition of parole. Under
indeterminate sentencing, the judge’s sentence has very little effect over how
long offenders stay in prison. Well-designed sentencing guidelines can also
provide appropriate policy-making and/or case-level roles for the sentencing
commission, victims and community representatives, probation officers, and
appellate courts. On the other hand, strict sentencing guidelines have the
potential to upset the balance of sentencing power; legislators, judges, and
scholars in some guidelines systems fear that charging and plea bargaining
practices allow the parties, and particularly the prosecution, to have too much
influence on the form or severity of the sentence — a problem to which I will
return.
Simplicity. The number and variety of sentencing goals listed above
naturally tends to make the drafting and implementation of guidelines more
complex. Yet Minnesota and most state guidelines drafters have recognized
that effective guideline standards and procedures must remain relatively
simple. The public and offenders must be able to understand the standards,
and both the standards and sentencing procedures must remain fairly easy for
courts and other officials to apply. Highly complex rules promote errors and
more disparity; they also waste scarce court and attorney time.
To summarize, early guidelines reforms attempted to narrow the focus of
sentencing to strongly emphasize uniformity and “just deserts,” and to promote
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more rational sentencing policy. The much broader range of contemporary
sentencing goals demonstrates an important underlying truth, which early
guidelines reforms (and some recent proposals) seem to have overlooked:
sentencing policy is very complex, requiring compromise and careful
balancing of numerous, often-competing goals. Yet the basic concepts and
rules must remain fairly easy for the public and system actors to understand
and apply. Designing a workable system to achieve all of these goals and
values is NOT a simple task!
III. WHAT HAVE GUIDELINES ACCOMPLISHED?
Now that we have a better idea of the goals which guidelines systems are
supposed to serve, we can turn to an evaluation of their accomplishments. I
have to preface these remarks, however, by admitting to you that no “expert”
on sentencing guidelines can tell you very much about how most state
guidelines systems have worked in practice. In some cases, this is because a
state’s system is too new to have generated enough data for evaluation. In
other cases, the reason is simply that the guidelines commission has not
published or commissioned any evaluations, nor is there some professor or
other outside researcher who takes a special interest in that state’s guidelines.
So keep in mind that much of what I put forth in this section is based on a few,
well-documented systems, and some “educated guesswork” about the rest.
Disparity reduction. Since most guidelines systems have abolished parole,
they have eliminated that form of disparity. Judicial sentencing disparities
have also been reduced, at least in the few states that have been evaluated.
Minnesota is the only system to have been subjected to extensive outside
evaluation, but data reported by sentencing commissions or their staffs suggest
that disparity has also been reduced in Delaware, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.5 It is possible, of course, that judicial sentencing disparities were
simply replaced by prosecutorial disparities. Most evaluations of state
sentencing guidelines have only examined disparity on the basis of the
conviction offense, since that is what state guideline rules are based on, but
evaluation of prosecutorial disparity requires analysis of “real offense” data.6
You will note that two of these five data-reporting jurisdictions do not
have legally-binding guidelines (Delaware’s are formally voluntary, and
Pennsylvania’s lack effective appellate review). Although much more research
is needed on this point, it may be that voluntary judicial guidelines can still be
effective to reduce disparity, at least if certain other factors are present:

5. Tonry, supra note 1, at 153-54.
6. For some examples of such analysis, see Richard S. Frase, Implementing CommissionBased Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL. 279, 299-303, 318 n.93, 321 (1993). For further discussion of prosecutorial
discretion and plea bargaining, see part IV, infra.
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Delaware is a very small state, with substantial informal “peer” pressure on
judges to conform to the guidelines; Pennsylvania has had a very strong and
active sentencing commission.
More rational sentencing policy. As shown in the table, most guidelines
systems include a permanent sentencing commission. Although some are more
active than others, all of these commissions have begun to develop useful
sentencing policy expertise, a comprehensive statewide view of punishment
priorities, better management of resources, and a long-term perspective. Even
in states with fairly weak guidelines, sentencing commissions can play an
important role, not just in drafting guidelines but also by advising the
legislature as to various sentencing policy matters of current concern.
As for the increasingly important goal of resource-impact assessment,
there is considerable evidence that sentencing guidelines can help to avoid
prison overcrowding and the kinds of dramatic (and very expensive) escalation
in prison populations which has occurred in many non-guidelines states in the
past fifteen years. Minnesota pioneered this concept and has successfully
avoided major prison overcrowding problems for almost two decades — a
period in which most non-guidelines states experienced both overcrowding and
court intervention. Although Minnesota’s prison population has increased
substantially since 1979, the average annual rate of growth (about five percent
per year) has only been about two-thirds the rate for the nation as a whole
(eight percent per year). Other guidelines jurisdictions which emphasized
resource-management goals have also had low average annual growth rates,
comparable to Minnesota’s. But average growth rates in guidelines systems
without these goals were higher (seven percent), and one of the highest average
rates of prison population growth in any system, with or without guidelines,
occurred in the federal system — about nine percent per year.
Two other goals closely related to the goal of resource management are the
development of detailed sentencing and correctional databases and the
promotion of greater use of intermediate sanctions. Improved data permits
more accurate prison population forecasts and more informed sentencing
policy formulation. Guidelines jurisdictions now possess by far the best
system-wide data on sentencing practices and correctional populations. When
it comes to the promotion of intermediate sanctions, however, sentencing
guidelines reforms have accomplished relatively little, for reasons I examine
later.
Another goal of rational sentencing policy is the development of effective
appellate review, including a sufficient body of caselaw to enforce guidelines
rules, clarify ambiguities, and develop sentencing policy through the timehonored, “common law” method.
Many guidelines systems (Alaska,
Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, Kansas, and the Federal courts) have
achieved a substantial body of appellate case law. Some observers believe that
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appellate review in the federal courts has gone too far, however, unduly
limiting trial court flexibility.7
Truth in Sentencing. Any system that has abolished parole release
discretion — as the majority of guidelines systems have done — has achieved
a greater degree of “truth in sentencing.” Of course, this goal has also been
achieved in a number of states that abolished parole without adopting judicial
sentencing guidelines. There are three reasons to believe, however, that the
abolition of parole works much better in a system with such guidelines. First,
systems with judicial guidelines have less need to rely on state-wide parole
standards as a means of reducing disparity in the sentences imposed by local
judges. Second, judicial guidelines can be used to encourage judges to lower
their sentence lengths, to reflect the much higher proportion of the prison term
that will be served after parole is abolished (and thus avoid massive increases
in prison populations). Third, systems with guidelines and a permanent
sentencing commission are in a better position to predict the effects abolition
of parole will have on prison populations; such systems can then either build
more prisons, modify the guidelines to lower prison commitment or duration
rates, or pursue a combination of these strategies. In contrast, the abolition of
parole, in a system without judicial guidelines, eliminates a means of
counteracting judicial disparity and prison overcrowding at the back end of the
sentencing process, without providing any means of controlling these problems
from the front end.
Public Safety. States with sentencing guidelines systems have generally
had stable or falling crime rates since their guidelines became effective. Crime
rates have recently been stable or falling in most states, however, with or
without guidelines. And, of course, crime rates depend on many social and
economic factors in addition to sentencing policy; a thorough examination of
the relationship between guidelines and public safety would thus be very
complex (and has not, to my knowledge, been attempted by quantitative
criminologists). But the stable or falling pattern of crime rates at least suggests
that sentencing guidelines do not threaten public safety.
Other goals. As for the other goals of guidelines reforms described
previously (that is, rehabilitation and reintegration, restorative and community
justice, rewarding defendant cooperation, shared sentencing power, and
simplicity), some guidelines systems have been particularly successful. The
Minnesota Guidelines have achieved greater uniformity, proportionality, and
truth in sentencing, while retaining enough flexibility to take account of
unusual offender characteristics and rehabilitation potential, local values and
resource limits, and emerging punishment theories such as restorative justice.8
7. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1458-71, 1498 (1998).
8. See generally Frase, supra note 3.
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By giving strong priority to the use of state prison space for violent and repeat
offenders, while emphasizing jail and other community-based sanctions for
less serious cases, the Guidelines promote public safety while avoiding prison
overcrowding and unnecessary incarceration.
Finally, the Minnesota
Guidelines allow sentencing policy to be significantly influenced by each of
the major actors and stakeholders: the legislature, the Commission, trial and
appellate courts, the prosecution and defense, crime victims and community
groups, probation officers, and prison officials. At the same time, the
Minnesota Guidelines remain fairly simple to understand and to apply.
Other state guidelines systems have not been as thoroughly evaluated as
Minnesota’s, but what we do know about them suggests that many of them
have also achieved a good balance in the areas described above.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the Federal Guidelines. There
have been a number of problems, some of which have already been noted.
First, federal appellate review has been very active, depriving trials courts of
needed flexibility. Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission did not adopt
resource management as a goal; thus, federal prisons have remained seriously
overcrowded, and federal prison population growth has been higher than the
national average—and much higher than in jurisdictions with guidelines
systems that emphasize resource management. Third, the Federal Guidelines
provide only limited scope for and encouragement of the use of intermediate
sanctions, and only specifically incorporate options that are alternative forms
of custody (community and intermittent confinement, and home detention).
Fourth, the Federal Guidelines not only permit, but often require, judges to
enhance sentences based on conduct that was not charged, or for which charges
led to dismissal or even acquittal; although some state guidelines systems
include occasional elements of “real-offense” sentencing, no state guidelines
system permits non-conviction-offense factors to play a substantial a role. A
fifth problem in the federal system results from severe mandatory minimum
penalties and related guidelines provisions which, in the view of many federal
judges, often result in unreasonably severe sentences. Finally, the Federal
Guidelines are NOT “simple” — the Federal Guidelines Manual currently runs
to over 400 pages in the West version (not counting appendices); the length of
the Minnesota Guidelines, at about sixty-five pages, is typical of most state
systems. To summarize: the Federal Guidelines are not well-balanced; they
contain a number of very problematic rules, lack desirable features found in
many state systems, and have sparked far more criticism than most state
guidelines systems.
IV. TWO PERSISTENT CHALLENGES
Despite the accomplishments of many state guidelines, there are a number
of legitimate criticisms, which can be leveled at even the best of these systems.
In this section, I would like to address two of the most important problems: (1)
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the failure to effectively regulate prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining;
and (2) the limited efforts to regulate the use of non-custodial (“intermediate”)
sanctions.9 I will concede that each of these “gaps” in guidelines coverage is a
problem, especially in some guidelines systems. I argue, however, that these
limitations are not a major problem in a well-designed system, and indeed may
even be strengths, helping these systems accommodate important
contemporary sentencing goals and values.
A.

Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining

Prosecutors in every American jurisdiction wield enormous “sentencing”
power because they have virtually unreviewable discretion to select the initial
charges and decide which charges to drop as part of plea bargaining. Since
guidelines limit the range of sentences available for a given offense, the power
to drop or not drop charges is the power to select the sentence range available
to the court (that is, what “box” on the grid the case ends up in). Thus, any
disparity in charging translates into disparity in sentencing. Unregulated
charging also makes it more difficult for the sentencing commission to predict
future resource needs. Yet no guidelines system has come up with an effective
way of structuring prosecutorial sentencing power, and its potential for
disparity and unpredictability. The Federal Guidelines tried to mitigate this
problem by requiring trial courts to consider certain alleged criminal acts (socalled “relevant conduct”) whether or not such acts were included in any
conviction offense.10 But this essentially lawless approach goes too far in the
opposite direction—allowing sentences to be based on weak charges which
were properly dismissed, resulted in acquittal, or were never even filed.
What should be done? Clearly efforts to structure prosecutorial discretion
and plea bargaining should continue, especially by means of internal,
administrative measures within prosecutor’s offices, such as written policies
and review of decisions by supervising staff. But we should not expect any
major “breakthroughs” in the near future. The absence, in all state guidelines
systems, of any serious attempt to externally regulate prosecutorial decisions
reflects the extraordinary difficulty of enforcing such controls in an adversary
system. This may yet be possible, but it will be very difficult—especially to
impose lower limits on charge and recommended-sentence severity (since, in

9. Other common criticisms of guidelines are that they do not give judges enough
discretion (or give them too much); that guidelines give too much weight to retributive sentencing
goals (or not enough); and that they promote undue sentencing severity (or undue leniency). For
a refutation of these opposing criticisms, as applied to the Minnesota Guidelines, see Richard S.
Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 10-33 (1993).
10. For a discussion of relevant conduct and its role in sentencing guidelines systems, see
Panel Remarks 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 409, in this issue.
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most cases, neither prosecutors nor defendants will appeal cases of prosecution
leniency).
I believe, however, that most state guidelines systems are valuable and
workable reforms even if prosecutorial decisions remain substantially
unregulated. I have two reasons for this belief. First, the absence of
widespread complaints about prosecutorial dominance in state guidelines
systems is an important sign, suggesting that closer regulation may not be
needed. Specifically, I am suggesting that, in a properly balanced guidelines
system—that is, one with reasonable sentence severity levels and few
mandatory minimum statutes, in which courts retain substantial sentencing
discretion for any given offense (e.g., broad guidelines ranges, limited
appellate scrutiny, and/or flexible departure powers), it is rare that
prosecutorial decisions will produce sentences which judges strongly
disapprove, yet are powerless to prevent (as often seems to occur in federal
courts). Second, prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining are valuable
sources of flexibility and moderation in sentencing. These discretionary
powers permit systems to consider individual offense and offender factors
which may not fit squarely within formal statutory and guidelines rules. And
of course, prosecutorial discretion also allows systems to tailor sentencing
severity to the available resources and evidence.
B.

Intermediate Sanctions

As shown in the accompanying table, only a few jurisdictions have
attempted to regulate the conditions of non-custodial sanctions, or even to
encourage broader use of such sanctions. Even the few jurisdictions that have
attempted to address these issues have not gone very far. Several systems
authorize judges, in certain cases, to substitute specified amounts of certain
intermediate sanctions for custody; for example, sixteen hours of community
service, or a day of home detention, might be substituted for a day of custody.
Two states, Pennsylvania and North Carolina, have attempted to define large
groups of offenders for whom various kinds of intermediate sanctions are
appropriate. These guidelines first classify penalties into three types:
incarceration (prison or jail), severe intermediate sanctions (such as residential
treatment), and mild intermediate sanctions (such as community service). In
some cells of the guidelines grid, only the most severe or the most lenient
sanction type is authorized; in other cells, the sentencing judge is given the
option of selecting among two (or even all three) of these sanction types.
This approach encourages judges to think about alternatives to custody,
and discourages them from imposing severe intermediate sanctions in very
minor cases. But the Pennsylvania and North Carolina Guidelines provide no
guidance as to the choice to be made when more than one sanction type is
allowed in a given cell, nor (when a non-custodial option is chosen), how much
of that option to impose (for instance, what length of home detention or
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community service). These two systems also provide little guidance for the
use of intermediate sanctions in response to violations of the conditions of
probation or post-prison release. Revocations of conditional release account for
a high proportion of state prison admissions in many states; judges and
correctional authorities need a range of structured sanctions at the “back end”
of the sentencing process, as well as at the “front end.”
Thus, an appropriate question is “Should all guidelines systems develop
detailed rules to regulate and encourage the use of intermediate sanctions?”
Perhaps, but only if certain conditions are met (and thus, probably only in
certain jurisdictions). The following factors need to be considered:
1. Are various intermediate sanctions available in most parts of the state,
and are they adequately funded? A number of state guidelines systems
(Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Ohio) have sought to encourage broader
use of intermediate sanctions through increased state funding for community
corrections.
2. Is there fairly broad field support for such guidelines? In Minnesota,
proposals to add any type of intermediate sanction guidelines have been met
with widespread resistance from attorneys, judges, and probation officers. And
Minnesota’s experience has shown that, where field resistance is high,
guidelines rules have been widely evaded.
3. Assuming sufficient funding and field support, what is the probable
impact of wider use of intermediate sanctions on prison and jail populations?
Prior experience with other “middle options” such as pretrial diversion and
boot camp suggests that broader use of restrictive intermediate sanctions might
not greatly reduce custody populations, and could even increase them. Many
of the offenders who receive these new sanctions would previously have
received less onerousness release conditions. Any increase in the number or
intensity of release conditions inevitably means an increase in the frequency of
probation violations, and thus at least some increase in prison or jail
commitment rates.
4. Are this jurisdiction’s guidelines already fairly detailed? Rules
governing the use of intermediate sanctions make guidelines more complex,
yet a major goal of most state guidelines reforms has been simplicity of
application. As I suggested previously, simplicity promotes better public and
offender understanding and acceptance of the rules, and reduces errors of
application. At some point, the cost of further complexity outweighs any
added benefits. This is particularly likely to be true in the sentencing of less
serious offenses.
5. How much importance does this jurisdiction place on non-retributive
sentencing goals? Flexibility in the imposition of probation conditions permits
greater individualization (to achieve crime-preventive goals), and a greater
degree of “local control” (so that sentencing policy and the use of local
resources may reflect important variations in local values and traditions). Such
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flexibility also allows sentences to more easily incorporate restorative and
community justice goals.
In light of the considerations listed above, detailed guidelines for
intermediate sanctions may make more sense in some jurisdictions than in
others; moreover, such guidelines inevitably make it more difficult to achieve a
number of competing sentencing goals. Nevertheless, all guidelines systems
can and should seek to develop standards—and resources—to promote
increased and more effective use of intermediate sanctions. Even if detailed
intermediate sanction guidelines are not deemed feasible or desirable, efforts
should be made to develop general “equivalency scales” between days of
custody and various intermediate sanctions. Such scales preserve judicial
discretion, while encouraging judges to substitute intermediate sanctions for
custody, and guiding them in the choice of specific sanction amounts.
CONCLUSION
After two decades of state guidelines reforms, what have we learned?
Here is a short list of the most important lessons which a review of this
experience teaches:
First: guidelines systems in a number of states have succeeded in
improving sentencing policy and practice by reducing bias and disparity in
sentencing; avoiding serious prison over-crowding; and ensuring that adequate
prison space is available for the most serious offenders. State guidelines
systems regulate but do not eliminate discretion; almost all of the existing
systems leave plenty of room for the consideration of unique offense and
offender characteristics, crime-preventive as well as retributive sentencing
purposes, local community values and resources, and emerging sentencing
theories such as restorative and community justice. Most state guidelines
systems have abolished parole release discretion, which serves to achieve truth
in sentencing; offenders serve most of the sentence imposed by the trial court,
and there is no pretense that sentences are longer than they really are. State
guidelines have achieved more rational sentencing policy because they are
developed and monitored by an independent, non-partizan agency charged
with the responsibility of collecting detailed data on sentencing practices and
resources, evaluating sentencing policy from a long-term perspective, setting
priorities for use of limited resources, and developing a comprehensive
approach to the sentencing of all crimes, thereby avoiding the problems of
piecemeal reforms. Although state sentencing commissions play a critical role
in guidelines systems, guidelines in Minnesota and most other states allow all
of the other major public and private stakeholders to have significant input into
the development and implementation of state sentencing policy. The
legislature maintains oversight and ultimate control over major policy issues,
and important roles are also played by trial and appellate judges, the defense
and prosecution, victims, community representatives, and correctional
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officials. And yet, most state guidelines systems remain relatively simple to
understand and apply.
Second: the best state guidelines work better, in all of the ways described
above, than any other sentencing system which has yet been tried or even
proposed. Quite simply, there is no realistic alternative as a means of
accommodating all of the many important values and principles we want
sentences to serve. The prior indeterminate sentencing system permitted
extremes of disparity that cannot be tolerated in a modern system of justice
governed by the rule of law. The unpredictable nature of indeterminate
sentencing also prevented effective resource-management, and violated the
public’s desire for truth in sentencing. Similar problems of disparity and
unpredictability would arise if any jurisdiction were to base its sentencing
system entirely on a theory of restorative or community justice. On the other
hand, highly “determinate” sentencing regimes—narrow, legislatively fixed
sentence ranges for all crimes, or mandatory-minimum terms for selected
offenses—go too far in the opposite direction. Mandatory penalties deny
courts needed flexibility, and invite wide-spread (but inconsistent) evasion,
thus making sentencing even more disparate, and greatly limiting the hoped-for
crime-control benefits. Systems of legislatively fixed penalty ranges for all
crimes have also proved undesirable, and no such law has been enacted since
the early 1980s. Legislators have realized that it is very difficult to specify
precise sentence ranges in advance and carefully monitor their implementation,
nor does the legislature have the time or expertise to do this—that is what a
sentencing commission is for. Finally, as was noted earlier, the current trend
to abolish parole-release discretion without enacting judicial sentencing
guidelines is arguably the worst combination of all, because it eliminates a
means of reducing judicial disparities and prison overcrowding, without
providing any replacement for these important functions.
Third: state sentencing guidelines systems are politically viable. They
have been successfully implemented in many states, and have survived—in
some cases for almost twenty years, which is a very long time, given the
extreme political salience and volatility of sentencing issues in recent years.
These systems have survived because they work, and in particular, because
they have managed to incorporate, and strike an acceptable balance between,
the diverse values and goals of late-twentieth century American sentencing
policy. Of course, there are no guarantees of success; a number of state
systems have been abandoned, and others have been substantially weakened.
The success of sentencing guidelines is spectacularly “contingent” as to both
place and time.11 Looking at the history of state guidelines adoptions,
rejections, expansions, contractions, and abolitions, it is difficult to find a

11. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 160-62 (1991).
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simple pattern, although several factors seem important: a “weak” system to
begin with (Louisiana, Wisconsin), and ballot-box policy making (Oregon).
Fourth: state guidelines continue to evolve and improve. Newer systems
are more likely to take advantage of the potential which guidelines provide for
resource-management and the promotion and structuring of intermediate
sanctions. Older systems are better today than when they began, because they
now openly recognize and incorporate the many, conflicting goals and values
in sentencing. Although early systems such as Minnesota’s were designed to
implement a theory of “Just Deserts,” we have learned that sentencing is more
complex than that. To achieve the goals of simplicity and rationality, it is
tempting to limit our sentencing purposes to retributive uniformity and
proportionality. But no American system has ever adopted and retained such a
narrow approach, and it probably never will. Nor should it.
Fifth: sentencing guideline reform remains an area of state, not federal
leadership. This reform began in the states; state guidelines systems have
improved over time more than the federal version; and most state systems have
avoided the strong opposition that the Federal Guidelines have evoked among
judges and sentencing scholars. Indeed, the federal contribution has largely
been negative; states have adopted guidelines despite the federal example, not
because of it (and have even felt the need to avoid the term “guidelines,”
because it seemed too closely associated with the federal version).
Finally: state sentencing guidelines systems are diverse. No two systems
are alike, and there is no single “model” that can or even should be universally
adopted. Again, it would nice if sentencing reform was simple—if we could
just look at the past two decades and say to legislators in every state: “Do this.”
But sentencing, perhaps more than any other field of law and public policy, is
closely related to the unique traditions, politics, and culture of each
jurisdiction. I continue to believe that Minnesota’s version is one of the best at
balancing and achieving all of the competing goals and values of sentencing,
and that other states should try to adopt it. But every system must ultimately
find its own way. In any case, the great diversity of guidelines systems
provides a rich menu of reform options and experience to guide sentencing
reformers in other states—and in the federal system.
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Summary of Sentencing Guidelines Systems (Fall 1999)
Major Structural Features
Jurisdiction

Parole
Release
Abolished

Effective
Appellate
Review

Mostly







ResourceImpact
Assessments

Initial Effective
Date

Permanent
Sentencing
Commission

Utah

Jan. 1979

Since 1983

Alaska

Jan. 1980

Minnesota

May 1980



Pennsylvania

July 1982



Maryland

July 1983

Since 1996

Florida

Oct. 1983

Until 1998



Some

1994-98

Michigan

Jan 1984

Since 1995

July 1984



Some,
1999


Since
1999


Since 1999

Washington
Delaware

Oct. 1987



Since
1990

FEDERAL

Nov. 1987







Since 1993

Some









Some

Some







Some

Until 1995



Nov. 1989


Until 1995

Virginia

Jan. 1991

Since 1994

Since
1995

ABA
Sentencing
Standards
(Third)

Feb. 1993







Kansas

July 1993







Arkansas

Jan. 1994



North
Carolina
Ohio

Oct. 1994





Some

July 1996



Mostly

Some



Missouri

Mar. 1997



Connecticut
Maine
Texas
Colorado
New York
Montana

Guidelines
Implemented,
then Repealed

Louisiana
(1992-95)
Wisconsin
(1985-95)





Nov. 1989

Guidelines
Considered
and Rejected:

Some

Since 1994

Tennessee

Alabama
Georgia
Iowa
Massachusetts
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Washington, D.C.
Wisconsin

Covers
Misdemeanor
Offenses



Oregon

Guidelines
Under
Consideration:

Incorporates
Intermediate
Sanctions

Since 1995





















